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ICRA HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF: 
A NEW HABEAS JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE 
POST-OLIPHANT WORLD? 
 
Hunter Cox* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 
(VAWA 2013) allows tribes to enforce criminal laws on their lands 
against non-Indians by relaxing federal restrictions on tribal 
jurisdiction through special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction 
(SDVCJ).1 This SDVCJ reflects congressional reaffirmation of the 
inherent tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, and is an 
important step towards ensuring the safety of Native American 
women within their own communities. This inherent sovereign 
power of tribes to provide safety and security in their communities 
through their own criminal laws was first questions by the 
Supreme Court in 1978 after centuries of tribes carrying on 
relations with non-Indians.  In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 
the Supreme Court held that tribes did not have criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians on their own reservations because 
“Indian tribes are prohibited from exercising both those powers of 
autonomous states that are expressly terminated by Congress and 
those powers ‘inconsistent with their status.’” 2  The Court 
concluded that, “by submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the 
United States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily give up their 
                                                                                                             
* Hunter Cox is a citizen of the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation and a recent 
graduate of the University of Michigan Law School and the Gerald R. Ford 
School of Public Policy. He is a law clerk at Van Ness Feldman, LLP, and 
former president of the non-profit National Native American Law Students 
Association (NNALSA). He would like to thank Professor Matthew Fletcher for 
his guidance and feedback on this article, all of the advocates fighting for the 
safety of our tribal communities, and of course mom and dad for their love and 
support. All opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and 
do not reflect the views of Van Ness Feldman, LLP, or its clients. 
1 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 
(1994) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §1304 (2013)). 
2 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).  
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power to try non-Indian citizens of the United States except in a 
manner acceptable to Congress.”3  
VAWA 2013 establishes Congress’s explicit answer to 
Oliphant, legislating its clear support of tribes’ inherent sovereign 
power to prosecute non-Indians, and creating the first specific 
exceptions to the Court’s rule against tribal prosecution of non-
Indians. Although VAWA 2013 does not overturn Oliphant, it 
narrows Oliphant’s applicability and has ushered in the post-
Oliphant world where tribes may prosecute non-Indians as 
sovereign entities. 
Although VAWA represents an important development for 
tribes and law and order on Indian reservations, tribal convictions 
may be challenged by writ of habeas corpus in federal court; 
therefore, the law will be as effective as the federal courts allow it 
to be. Ultimately, the federal courts’ treatment of tribal convictions 
on habeas review, as well as the tribal courts that produce them, 
will determine the law’s success in stemming the violence against 
women occurring throughout Indian country. 
This article discusses several issues that arise from the 
confluence of the tribal sovereignty doctrine, federal habeas 
corpus, and the exhaustion doctrine under VAWA 2013. Because 
the Constitution does not apply to tribes as it does to the states,4 the 
legal structure of VAWA 2013 raises novel constitutional concerns 
within Indian law jurisprudence. As more tribes implement 
VAWA 2013, these new questions will likely be raised via habeas 
corpus challenges under the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). How 
the Constitution will apply to criminal defendants in tribal courts, 
or alternatively, how tribal courts will apply pseudo-constitutional 
individual rights in criminal cases, is beyond the scope of this 
article. However, this article addresses how federal courts will 
interpret and decide the federal habeas corpus rules and the 
processes that courts will use to ultimately decide those substantive 
questions of constitutional rights and the tribal sovereignty 
doctrine. 
Part I describes the background and legislative history of 
VAWA 2013, highlighting the debate in Congress between 
permitting tribes to exercise their inherent sovereign jurisdiction 
                                                                                                             
3 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210. 
4 Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1898). 
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and delegating federal jurisdiction to the tribes. 5  Congress’s 
decision to maintain inherent sovereignty reaffirms the Doctrine of 
Tribal Sovereignty and ultimately will lead to more effective and 
fair tribal laws. Part II describes the writ of habeas corpus in more 
detail and discusses the complex legal questions arising from 
Congress’s decision to reaffirm inherent tribal authority in VAWA 
2013. Both habeas corpus and tribal sovereignty jurisprudence 
have strong exhaustion doctrines based in the orderly management 
of justice and respect for other sovereigns in the federalist system. 
VAWA 2013’s immediate habeas review for SDVCJ convictions 
and stay of detention remedies run contrary to these principles. 
Part III analyzes the clear language of ICRA, as amended by 
VAWA 2013, which establishes unique habeas corpus remedies 
but does not clearly establish the procedural rules and standards for 
granting habeas relief. In applying the “substantial likelihood” 
standard, which is the standard that an SDVCJ habeas petitioner 
must satisfy to be granted immediate relief under VAWA 2013, the 
federal courts must rely on the current binding tribal exhaustion 
doctrine established in National Farmers and its progeny. Thus, 
this article concludes that Congress has created new federal habeas 
remedies in VAWA 2013 that must be interpreted through the 
Supreme Court’s long-standing precedents on tribal exhaustion 
requirements.   
Ultimately, as tribal governments continue developing and as 
more tribal legislatures pass criminal codes under SDVCJ, 
questions about the delicate coexistence of, and interaction 
between, tribal and American sovereignty will arise in ICRA 
habeas corpus litigation. In resolving these complex questions, 
federal courts should refrain from judicial activist tendencies as 
seen under the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. Interpretations of 
VAWA 2013’s unprecedented, immediate federal habeas corpus 
relief and the application of habeas corpus precedent in the ICRA 
context more generally should be based upon federal Indian law, 
the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, and the very real policy impacts 
                                                                                                             
5 This distinction has important appellate ramifications. Delegated authority 
would simply federalize any tribal SDVCJ convictions, with tribal prosecutors 
essentially acting as deputized federal prosecutors. The resulting convictions 
would be reviewable in federal courts on direct appeal. Inherent authority 
maintains the three distinct sovereigns in the federalist system, with tribes 
prosecuting crimes under their own authority and purview similar to state 
prosecutions, but with federal government review on habeas. 
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of tribal sovereign prosecutions of domestic violence in securing 
safe communities for Native Americans. Indian country should 
share in the overall safety benefits that the rest of the country has 
enjoyed since the initial passage of VAWA in 1993.  
 
I.Brief Introduction to Habeas Corpus and VAWA 2013 
 
Originally only available for federal convictions, the Habeas 
Corpus Act of 1867 expanded federal habeas corpus review in 
order to protect civil rights in the South in the wake of the Civil 
War.6 Congress and the federal courts have significantly limited 
access to habeas corpus review in recent years. Habeas corpus has 
become a pipe dream for state and federal prisoners given that only 
0.35% of habeas petitions filed are granted habeas relief. 7 Yet for 
federal collateral attacks on tribal convictions, Congress has 
greatly expanded federal habeas review powers in VAWA 2013, 
but only for tribal prosecutions of non-Indians under inherent tribal 
authority. 8  The Supreme Court held in Oliphant v. Suquamish 
Indian Tribe that tribes are prohibited from exercising their 
inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 9  VAWA 2013 
establishes three exceptions to the Oliphant rule, for domestic 
violence, dating violence, and restraining order violations.10   
In contrast to what has been called the “incredible shrinking 
writ” for federal review of state convictions, 11  VAWA 2013 
significantly expanded federal habeas corpus review of tribal 
convictions.12 The VAWA 2013 amendments did not extend the 
                                                                                                             
6 Judiciary Act of February 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385-86, reprinted in Fay v. 
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 441-45 (1963) (codified as amended 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) 
(1996)). Federal habeas corpus act codified at 28 U.S.C. §§2241-2254. 
7 Lynn Adelman, The Great Writ Diminished, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 3, 5 (2009). 
8 See Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 
(1994) (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 1304 (2013)). VAWA 2013 amends the 
Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), which provides “the privilege of the writ of 
habeas corpus shall be available to any person, in a court of the United States, to 
test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian tribe.” Indian Civil Rights 
Act (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. § 1303. 
9 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding that tribes 
do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian offenders). 
10 25 U.S.C. §1304(c) (2013). 
11 Jeanne-Marie Raymond, The Incredible Shrinking Writ: Habeas Corpus 
Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 9 CAP. DEF 
J. 52, 52 (1996). 
12 25 U.S.C. §1304(c) (2013). 
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habeas procedural barriers to federal review of state convictions to 
Section 1304(e) SDVCJ habeas review. Instead, Congress created 
completely unique tribal habeas corpus remedies for immediate 
federal habeas review and the completely unprecedented remedy of 
a federal stay of detention of convicted offenders.13 Under VAWA 
2013, the federal habeas court is not even required to decide the 
habeas petition on the merits before ordering a stay of detention, 
but merely must find a “substantial likelihood” the petitioner 
would be granted habeas relief.14 
These SDVCJ habeas remedies far exceed the federal authority 
on habeas review of state convictions as amended in the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(“AEDPA”).15 AEDPA codifies recent Supreme Court precedent 
limiting state petitioner access to federal habeas review by 
increasing procedural requirements. VAWA 2013’s unprecedented 
federal invasion of tribal court jurisdiction demeans tribal 
sovereignty, creates uncertainty about the ICRA habeas 
jurisprudence, and chills the effective implementation of tribal 
SDVCJ. Although Congress reaffirmed inherent tribal sovereignty 
over non-Indians for SDVCJ,16 permitting federal habeas review 
without requiring petitioners to exhaust tribal remedies undermines 
both tribal sovereignty and habeas exhaustion jurisprudence. No 
such deference is given to tribes under VAWA 2013. VAWA 
2013’s unprecedented habeas remedies of contradict those 
principles. 
VAWA 2013 marks the first time that tribes may prosecute 
non-Indian criminals in their own communities since the Court’s 
1978 Oliphant decision to limit tribal jurisdiction.17 In writing the 
opinion of the Court, Justice Rehnquist applied “racist nineteenth-
century beliefs and stereotypes … [of] Indian tribes, as lawless and 
uncivilized savage peoples.”18 The Court supported its abrogation 
of tribal criminal jurisdiction with “unsupported conclusions 
tainted by judicial activism,” and cited dubious precedential 
                                                                                                             
13 25 U.S.C. §1304(e)(2) (2013).    
14 25 U.S.C. §1304(e) (2013). 
15 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §2254 et seq.). 
16 25 U.S.C. §1304(b)(1) (2013). 
17 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 191. 
18 ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, 
INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA, 98 (2005). 
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authority for its holding.19 The Court found that “[c]ongress never 
expressly forbade Indian tribes [from] impos[ing] criminal 
penalties on non-Indians,” thus “impl[ying] … that Congress 
consistently believed” Indian tribes did not have jurisdiction over 
non-Indians. 20  This holding overlooked the fact that Congress 
never legislated the matter and completely contradicted the 
longstanding Indian cannons of construction, which dictate that 
ambiguities are to be held in favor of the tribes.21 The Oliphant 
decision was based more on the biases, stereotypes, and incorrect 
“historical perspective”22 of the Justices rather than equitable legal 
and historical analysis.23 The Supreme Court reinforced the weak 
reasoning of the Oliphant decision two weeks later in U.S. v 
Wheeler by inventing the idea that Congress may “implicitly 
divest[]” tribes of their inherent powers in addition to explicit 
abrogation by statute or treaty.24 
Although not the full legislative reversal of Oliphant that tribes 
have long advocated for, 25  VAWA 2013 is a significant step 
towards federal acknowledgment of full tribal criminal jurisdiction 
over Indian lands. As of March of 2015 at the close of the SDVCJ 
pilot project, 26  five SDVCJ pilot programs in Pascua Yaqui, 
Umatilla, Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate, Fort Peck and the Tulalip 
Tribe of Washington have successfully resulted in 28 
                                                                                                             
19 Geoffrey C. Heisey, Oliphant and Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction over Non-
Indians: Asserting Congress’s Plenary Power to Restore Territorial 
Jurisdiction, 73 Indian L. J. 1051, 1062, 1051 n.3 (1998).  (There is a long 
literature of Indian law scholars criticizing the Oliphant decision).   
20 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 201. 
21 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 582 (1832) (McLean J., concurring). 
22 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206. 
23 See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Resisting Federal Courts on Tribal 
Jurisdiction, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 973 (2010); R. BERKHOFER, THE WHITE 
MAN’S INDIAN (Vintage ed. 1979); CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN 
INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY, 43 (1987) (describing the Court’s rationale in Oliphant as a 
"visceral reaction" to tribes rather than legal reasoning of legal precedent and 
Congress’s policy of Indian self-determination). 
24 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978) (“The areas in which such 
implicit divestiture of sovereignty have been held to have occurred are those 
involving the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe”). 
25 National Congress of American Indians (“NCAI”), Combating Domestic 
Violence and Sexual Assault: A Call for a Full Oliphant Fix, Resolution #SPO-
16-037 (July 30, 2016) (available at 
http://www.ncai.org/resources/resolutions/combatting-non-indian-domestic-
violence-and-sexual-assault-a-call-for-a-full-oliphant-fixf).  
26 VAWA Sec. 908(a). 
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convictions. 27  Currently, any tribe may implement SDVCJ 
jurisdiction over non-Indians for a limited scope of domestic 
violence and related crimes committed in Indian country.28 
Congressional debate over VAWA 2013 highlighted the 
concern that tribal courts will not provide due process and other 
protections afforded by the U.S. Constitution to non-Indian 
defendants. 29  Noting that tribes are not subject to the U.S. 
Constitution, 30  VAWA 2013 opponents argued that American 
citizens will be tried in tribal courts without the benefit of 
fundamental criminal procedure rights guaranteed in the U.S. 
Constitution. 31  For example, Senator Chuck Grassley told an 
audience “on an Indian reservation, [the jury is] going to be made 
up of Indians, right? So the non-Indian doesn’t get a fair trial,”32 
implying that Native Americans are unable to act as impartial 
jurors. Senator Grassley and other opponents of VAWA 2013 have 
not raised the same concerns for Indian defendants in state and 
federal courts tried by completely non-Indian juries. 
A. Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction 
 
However, as sovereign “domestic dependent nations,”33 tribes 
have their own inherent authority to create and enforce their own 
                                                                                                             
27 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 
§904(b)(2), 127 Stat. 121 (2013) (codified at 25 U.S.C. 1304); NAT’L CONG. OF 
AMERICAN INDIANS, SPECIAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 
PILOT PROJECT REPORT, 8-13 (October 29, 2015). 
28 VAWA Sec. 908(a).  
29 Whether congressional representatives may have similar concerns about tribal 
court treatment of Indians is irrelevant given that tribes already have criminal 
jurisdiction over them. 
30 Talton, 163 U.S. 376. 
31 Although tribes are not constrained by the U.S. Constitution, all Native 
Americans have been citizens since 1924, when Congress passed the Indian 
Citizenship Act of 1924, Pub. L. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253, and are no less 
understanding of its protections than American citizens who are not Indians.  
32 Jennifer Benderly, Chuck Grassley On VAWA: Tribal Provision Means ‘The 
Non-Indian Doesn’t Get A Fair Trial,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 21, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/21/chuck-grassley-
vawa_n_2735080.html; See also Kate Pickert, What’s Wrong With The Violence 
Against Women Act?, TIME (Feb. 27, 2013), 
http://nation.time.com/2013/02/27/whats-wrong-with-the-violence-against-
women-act/ (noting Republican opposition to tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians 
because of Constitutional concerns); Ryan Devreskracht, House Republicans 
Add Insult To Native Women’s Injury, 3 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 1, 
1-4 (2014). 
33 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). 
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laws independent of the U.S. Constitution and Congress. 34 
Although the Supreme Court judicially restrained tribal jurisdiction 
over non-Indian criminal defendants in Oliphant under U.S. v. 
Wheeler’s theory of “implicit divestiture,” 35  Congress can act 
explicitly to correct the court’s errors. For example, Congress 
passed the “Duro-Fix” 36  to “change ‘judicially made’ federal 
Indian law through … legislation” 37  after the Supreme Court 
further constrained tribal criminal jurisdiction to only tribal 
members in Duro v. Reina.38 Ultimately, Congress has “plenary 
power” in Indian affairs,39 such that tribal sovereignty “exists only 
at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete 
defeasance.” 40 Thus, Congress may also “enact[] a new statute, 
relaxing restrictions on the bounds of the inherent tribal authority 
that the United States recognizes.”41 
Congress has recently increased efforts to improve safety in 
Indian country through passing VAWA 2013 and the Tribal Law 
and Order Act of 2010 (TLOA), which expanded tribal sentencing 
authority.42 VAWA 2013 SDVCJ will improve the safety of Native 
American women by permitting tribal prosecution of domestic 
violence crimes. 43  Specifically, this partial Oliphant-fix 
“affirm[s]… the powers of self-government of a participating tribe 
[to] include the inherent power of that tribe … to exercise special 
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over all persons.”44 This 
includes non-Indian defendants that reside or are employed in 
                                                                                                             
34 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959). 
35 Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326.  
36 Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, §8077(d), 104 Stat. 
1893 (temporary legislation until September 30, 1991); Act of Oct. 28, 1991, 
105 Stat. 646 (permanent legislation) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 25 U.S.C.); See generally Geoffrey C. Heisey, Oliphant and Tribal Criminal 
Jurisdiction over Non-Indians: Asserting Congress’s Plenary Power to Restore 
Territorial Jurisdiction, 73 INDIAN L. J. 1051, 1071-75 (1998).   
37 U.S. v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 207 (2004). 
38 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
39 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). 
40 Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323. 
41 Lara, 541 U.S. at 207. 
42 Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 
2261 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 25 
U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
43 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 
(1994) (current version at 25 U.S.C. §1304 (2013)). 
44 25 U.S.C. §1304(b)(1) (2013). 
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Indian country of the participating tribe,45 or are a spouse, intimate 
partner, or dating partner of a tribal member or nonmember Indian 
residing in the Indian country of the participating tribe.46 VAWA 
2013 gives subject matter jurisdiction to the participating tribe over 
domestic violence, dating violence, and violations of tribe-issued 
protection orders.47   
Congress pass TLOA in 2010 to increase tribal law 
enforcement presence in Indian country by providing grants, 
increased cross-deputization opportunities with state and federal 
agencies, and increasing tribal sentencing authority. Under TLOA, 
tribes imposing an “enhanced sentence” of at least one year must 
provide the defendant with “effective assistance of counsel at least 
equal to that guaranteed by the United States Constitution,” 
including indigent defense. 48  Additionally, TLOA establishes 
judicial standards and prior notice by publication of the laws as 
requirements to impose enhanced sentences. 49  Various tribal 
enhanced jurisdiction and sentencing authorities have been 
recently recognized in several different acts passed by Congress. 
The TLOA recognizes tribal sentences greater than one year if the 
defendant is guaranteed effective assistance of counsel equal to the 
Sixth Amendment, 50  indigent assistance by a licensed defense 
attorney, 51  public notice of all laws prior to charging the 
defendant,52 and creation of a trial record.53 Additionally, the judge 
presiding over the criminal proceeding must have “sufficient legal 
training to preside over criminal proceedings,” and be licensed to 
practice law in any U.S. jurisdiction.54 Tribes exercising SDVCJ 
and fulfilling TLOA requirements may sentence defendants up to 
three years per separate offense that would be “punishable by more 
                                                                                                             
45 25 U.S.C. §1304(b)(4)(B)(i, ii) (2013).  
46 25 U.S.C. §1304(b)(4)(B)(iii) (2013).  
47 25 U.S.C. §1304(c)(2013). 
48 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(1-2) (2013) (It is unclear why TLOA mandates tribal 
provision of counsel for indigent defendants in § 1302(c)(2), when such a right 
is already ensured through the constitutionally-equivalent requirement in § 
1302(c)(1); this language makes it unclear whether TLOA’s effective assistance 
of counsel right is coextensive with Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to 
counsel). 
49 25 U.S.C. §1302(c)(3-4) (2012). 
50 25 U.S.C. §1302(c)(1) (2012). 
51 Id. at §1302(c)(2). 
52 Id. at §1302(c)(4). 
53 Id. at §1302(c)(5). 
54 Id. at §1302(c)(3). 
2017] ICRA Habeas Corpus Relief 606 
 
 
than one year of imprisonment if prosecuted by the United States 
or any of the States.”55 The total sentence a tribe can impose with 
consecutive sentences is nine years.56 
In VAWA 2013, Congress used similar constitutional 
equivalence language in requiring that all SDVCJ defendants must 
receive “all other rights whose protection is necessary under the 
Constitution of the United States in order for Congress to 
recognize and affirm the inherent power of the participating tribe 
to exercise criminal jurisdiction over the defendant.”57 Although 
there is some debate about the constitutionality of VAWA 2013 
because the Act creates statutory rather than Constitutional rights, 
the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) guarantees similar substantive 
rights as those guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.58 This includes “the 
right to a trial by an impartial jury that is drawn from sources that – 
(A) reflect a fair cross section of the community; and (B) do not 
systematically exclude any distinctive group in the community, 
including non-Indians.”59 The “fair cross section” language tracks 
the “constitutional imperative of race neutrality in jury selection”60 
that “juries as instruments of public justice…be a body truly 
representative of the community.”61 In Glasser v. U.S., the Court 
grounded this fair “cross section” requirement in the Sixth 
Amendment,62 which may be applicable to tribal convictions with 
enhanced sentences under TLOA.63 
The VAWA 2013 amendments depart significantly from the 
analogous state habeas statutes, which focus on respecting the 
sovereignty of states and their judicial processes. 64  Instead of 
                                                                                                             
55 Id. at §1302(b)(2).  
56 Id. at §1302(a)(7)(d). 
57 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(4) (2013). 
58 See generally JANE M. SMITH & RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R42488, TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER NON-INDIANS IN THE 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT (VAWA) REAUTHORIZATION AND SAVE 
NATIVE WOMEN ACT (2012); Samuel E. Ennis, Reaffirming Indian Tribal Court 
Criminal Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians: An Argument For A Statutory 
Abrogation of Oliphant, 57 UCLA L. REV. 553 (2009). 
59 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(3)(A-B) (2013). 
60 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991). 
61 Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940). 
62 Glasser v. U.S., 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942). 
63 See Sanjay K. Chhablani, Re-Framing The ‘Fair Cross-Section’ Requirement, 
13 J. OF CONST. L. 932-33 (2011) (Tribes may apply different standards, as 
critics have lamented the fair cross section standard as “stagnant” and 
insufficient constitutional protections). 
64 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2011).  
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commanding exhaustion of tribal remedies just as state court 
remedies must be exhausted, VAWA 2013 mandates that federal 
courts “shall grant a stay [of detention]” to SDVCJ §1303 habeas 
petitioners “if the court finds that there is a substantial likelihood 
that the habeas corpus petition will be granted.”65  To grant the 
stay, the reviewing court must also find “by clear and convincing 
evidence that under conditions imposed by the court, the petitioner 
is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any person or the 
community if released.”66 The Act also gives “each alleged victim 
in the matter an opportunity to be heard” before the court rules on 
the petitioner’s stay of detention.67 This language is similar to the 
federal criminal direct appeal procedural rules for post-conviction 
challenges. 68  Adopting this language would have provided 
defendants with federal criminal procedure remedies like removal 
and direct appeals rather than habeas review. Ultimately, Congress 
reaffirmed inherent tribal jurisdiction rather than delegating 
constitutional authority from the federal government to tribes for 
SDVCJ prosecutions. 
VAWA 2013 contains a catchall provision including “all other 
rights whose protection is necessary under the Constitution of the 
United States in order for Congress to recognize and affirm the 
inherent power of the participating tribe to exercise SDVCJ over 
the defendant.” 69  This language gives way to two possible 
interpretations. 70  First, if Congress intends for “recognize and 
affirm” to mean that only the requirements already outlined in 
ICRA71 are required for affirmation of SDVCJ convictions, then 
some constitutional protections incorporated against the states 
would be excluded. This interpretation would “exclude several 
protections accorded under the United States Constitution as 
applied against the states, including a jury of one’s peers and the 
right to counsel in misdemeanor cases where the defendant faces 
actual punishment.”72 
                                                                                                             
65 25 U.S.C. § 1304(e)(A) (2013) (emphasis added). 
66 Id. at § 1304(e)(2)(B). 
67 Id. 
68 18 U.S.C. § 3245.  
69 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(4) (2017).   
70 SMITH & THOMPSON, supra note 58.  
71 See generally 25 U.S.C. § 1301-1304.  
72 See SMITH & THOMPSON, supra note 58, at 4. 
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Alternatively, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary applied a 
different interpretation and viewed the provision as “protect[ing] 
effectively the same constitutional rights as guaranteed in State 
court criminal proceedings.”73 The United States’ Constitution did 
not originally apply to the states, 74  and the Supreme Court 
eventually applied the Bill of Rights by selective incorporation 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.75 Rights that are “implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty”76 or necessary for the “fundamental 
fairness essential to the very concept of justice” 77  have been 
incorporated against the states. However, under Talton v. Mayes 
these constitutional rights do not apply to tribes, and ICRA 
provides the only federal individual rights which constrain tribal 
governments.78 Ultimately, ICRA’s provisions guarantee both the 
right to an impartial jury under Section 1304(d)(3) and the right to 
counsel under Section 1302(c) in SDVCJ prosecutions.79Although 
this language ensures that SDVCJ defendants will be afforded 
those constitutional equivalent rights, the language does not 
resolve the ambiguity of the phrase “recognize and affirm.”80   
Courts can resolve this ambiguity by developing the individual 
rights requirements of ICRA Section 1304(d) as a statutory vehicle 
for selective incorporation of tribal criminal law into the federal 
constitutional system.81 Although some scholars have argued “only 
                                                                                                             
73 S. REP. 112-153, at 10 (2012). 
74 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833). 
75 E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth Amendment prohibition on 
admitting evidence obtained through unlawful searches and seizures applies to 
state as well as federal governments); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
(1963) (state courts are required to provide counsel in criminal cases under the 
Sixth Amendment); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
76 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
77 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 235 (1941). 
78 Talton, 163 U.S. 376. 
79 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d) (2013). 
80 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(4) (“All other rights whose protection is necessary under 
the Constitution of the United States in order for Congress to recognize and 
affirm the inherent power of the participating tribe to exercise [SDVCJ].”). 
81 Some scholars argue that tribes have been incorporated into the federal system 
already. See Richard A. Monette, A New Federalism for Indian Tribes: The 
Relationship Between the United States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism 
and Republican Democracy, 25 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 617, 631 (1994); Carol 
Tebben, An American Trifederalism Based Upon the Constitutional Status of 
Tribal Nations, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 318 (2003). However, other scholars argue 
tribes remain unincorporated.  See generally Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, 
Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 1, 21-46 (1987); Alex T. 
Skibine, United States v. Lara, Indian Tribes, and the Dialectic of 
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a constitutional amendment can truly guarantee…tribal 
sovereignty,” 82  Congress’s plenary authority in Indian affairs 
means that legislation is sufficient to protect tribal sovereignty and 
avoid the complexities of the constitutional amendment process.83 
The VAWA 2013 framework preserves inherent tribal sovereignty 
by creating exceptions to the Oliphant rule, rather than converting 
inherent tribal sovereignty into constitutional authority and 
necessarily making tribal sovereignty a power delegated from the 
Constitution. In this way, Congress has struck a delicate balance 
between protecting tribal legal and cultural norms84 and ensuring 
constitutionally sufficient tribal prosecutions through federal 
habeas review.85 
 
B. Legislative History of VAWA 2013 
 
President Obama signed VAWA 2013 into law because “tribal 
governments have an inherent right to protect their people, and all 
women … including Native American women left vulnerable by 
gaps in the law … deserve the right to live free from fear.”86 Many 
years of tribal activists’ efforts culminated in Title IX of the 
VAWA 2005 reauthorization, which was passed for the purposes 
of decreasing violence against Indian women, holding offenders 
                                                                                                             
Incorporation, 40 TULSA L. REV. 47, 49 (2004) (“No single act of Congress that 
can be said to have officially ‘incorporated’ tribes within the political system of 
the United States…If [incorporation] did occur, it can only have been done 
incrementally as a result of a series of congressional legislation and court 
decisions.”). 
82 See Frank Pommersheim, Is There a (Little or Not So Little) Constitutional 
Crisis Developing in Indian Law?: A Brief Essay, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 271, 285 
(2003). 
83 Cf., id., at fn. 21.  
84 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-9 (1978) (holding that ICRA 
provides no federal court review for individual rights violations in the civil 
context). 
85 An amendment introduced by Republican Representative Darrell Issa, would 
have created a right for “a defendant charged with a crime under this section [to] 
petition the appropriate Federal district for removal pursuant to [18 U.S.C. § 
3245].” See Violence Against Indian Women Act, H.R.6625, 112th Cong. § 2 
Removal of Criminal Prosecutions (2012) (This amendment did not pass the 
house, and S. 47 retained ICRA’s only federal relief through writ of habeas 
corpus). 
86 President Barack Obama, President Signs 2013 VAWA – Empowering Tribes 
to Protect Native Women (March 7, 2013), available at 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2013/03/07/president-signs-2013-
vawa-empowering-tribes-protect-native-women.   
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accountable, and “strengthen[ing] the capacity of Indian tribes to 
exercise their sovereign authority to respond to violent crimes 
committed against Indian women.”87 Congress acknowledged that 
“1 out of every 3 Indian women are raped in their lifetime” and 
explicitly stated that the “United States … [has] a Federal trust 
responsibility to assist tribal governments in safeguarding the lives 
of Indian women,” and authorized funds for studies and grants for 
tribal programs.88   
In 2006, Amnesty International shined a spotlight on the 
staggering disparity between rates of domestic and sexual violence 
against Native American women when compared to the population 
generally. 89  Amnesty focused on the jurisdictional and 
governmental structure issues that exacerbated the rates of sexual 
violence and predation experience in Indian country.90  In 2009, 
reported instances of rape nationwide were down 60% 91  and 
murders of women by their abusive partners were down 72% since 
the passage of VAWA in 1994.92 Nation-wide, the incidence of 
intimate partner violence fell by 67%, individuals killed by an 
intimate partner declined by 35%, and non-fatal intimate partner 
violence decreased by 53%.93 State reforms since 1994 resulted in 
660 state laws to protect against domestic and sexual violence by 
criminalizing stalking, date rape, and spousal rape.94 As the stigma 
of domestic violence receded in the wake of VAWA, reporting of 
domestic violence increased 51% nationwide since VAWA was 
first passed in 1994.95  
The benefits of VAWA did not occur in Indian country, where 
the “jurisdictional gap created by Oliphant has had grave 
                                                                                                             
87 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-162, § 
902, 119 Stat. 2960 (codified with some differences in language at 42 U.S.C. 
3796gg). 
88 Id. at § 904, § 906. 
89 Maze of Injustice: The Failure to Protect Indigenous Women from Sexual 
Violence in the USA, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATIONS (2007), 
https://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/mazeofinjustice.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 
2017). 
90 Id. at 27-49, 61-71. 
91 S. REP. NO. 112-265, at 2 (2012). 
92 The Continued Importance of the Violence Against Women Act Before the 
Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 3 (2009) (remarks by Senator 
Kaufman). 
93 S. REP. NO. 112-265, 3 (2012). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
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consequences for Indian women… [who] are left without any 
recourse when the perpetrator is non-Indian.” 96  Although 
nationwide there were improvements in reporting, only “49 percent 
of Native women victimization is reported to the police, [and] only 
17 percent is reported directly by the victim.” 97  Congress 
ostensibly recognized the need for the jurisdictional authority of 
tribes to protect their communities as the only solution to address 
violence on reservations. 98  The Senate Committee on Indian 
Affairs (SCIA) ordered the SAVE Act to be reported to the Senate, 
with the recommendation that it be passed, on December 27, 2012, 
after which the Senate Judiciary Committee incorporated its core 
provisions into the 2013 VAWA Reauthorization.99 
Without criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, tribes had not 
seen similar successes in decreasing rates of domestic violence in 
their communities. Given that 80% of Native American victims of 
rape or sexual assault describe their attackers as white,100 tribes 
were unable to prosecute most sexual and domestic abuse 
offenders. Moreover, in 2010, federal prosecutors declined 67% of 
sexual abuse cases in Indian country. 101  Because the federal 
government had exclusive jurisdiction over all major crimes and 
crimes committed by non-Indians in Indian country, tribes were 
often unable to punish non-Indian criminals in their own 
                                                                                                             
96 S. REP. NO. 112-265, at 5 (2012).   
97 Id. at 5, 39 & Table 10; See also RONET BACHMAN, ET AL., VIOLENCE 
AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE WOMEN AND THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE RESPONSE: WHAT IS KNOWN, (2008) 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/223691.pdf. 
98 Native Women: Protecting, Shielding, and Safeguarding Our Sisters, Mothers, 
and Daughters, Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. 9-10 (2011) 
(Prepared remarks from Thomas J. Perrelli, Associate Attorney General, U.S. 
Department of Justice). (“The first area for potential Federal legislation involves 
recognizing certain tribes’ concurrent criminal jurisdiction to investigate, 
prosecute, convict and sentence Indians and non-Indians who assault Indian 
spouses, intimate partners, or dating partners, or who violate protection orders, 
in Indian country.”). 
99 Id.  
100 See STEVEN W. PERRY, AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME, A BJS STATISTICAL 
PROFILE, 1992-2002, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 9 
(2004) (noting that nearly 4 in 5 American Indian victims of rape/sexual assault 
described the offender as white). 
101 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO–11–167R, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF JUSTICE DECLINATIONS OF INDIAN COUNTRY CRIMINAL MATTERS 3–9 
(2010). 
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communities.102 This gave non-Indian perpetrators free reign on 
many reservations, and incentivized non-Indian people to target 
Indian women.103 With jurisdiction over 20% of domestic violence 
and/or sexual violence perpetrators, tribal governments were 
unable to protect their communities. 
On the Senate floor, critics emphasized that Congress voted 
unanimously “on the two previous occasions the Senate has voted 
to reauthorize the VAWA.” 104  However, in 2013 “the key 
stumbling block [was] the [Indian] provision.”105 Disregarding the 
serious epidemic of violence experienced by Native women, 
VAWA 2013 opponents labeled the Title IX amendment as “just 
another vehicle for scoring political points or bowing to special 
interests.” 106  Senator Cornyn explained that the reason for 
Republican opposition was the “blatantly unconstitutional” SDVCJ 
that would “deny U.S. citizens their full constitutional protections 
under the Bill of Rights in tribal courts,” and offered an 
amendment allowing SDVCJ “as long as those tribes followed the 
Constitution and allowed all convictions to be appealed in the 
Federal court system.”107   
Proponents of the bill responded on the senate floor. Senator 
Cantwell emphasized that habeas corpus remained available to test 
constitutionally-deficient tribal convictions under ICRA in the 
federal courts.108 She also criticized the competing amendment’s 
use of exclusive federal jurisdiction, asking “who will prosecute 
these crimes?” if tribes were prevented from conducting their own 
prosecutions. 109  Given that “four out of five perpetrators of 
domestic or sexual violence on tribal lands are non-Indian and 
                                                                                                             
102 Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 385 (1885) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 
1153 (2008)). 
103 Hearing on S. 1763, S. 872, & S. 1192, Before the S. Comm. on Indian 
Affairs, 112th Cong. 9 (2011) (statement of Thomas J. Perrelli, Assoc. Att’y 
General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, ‘‘[T]he current jurisdictional framework has left 
many serious acts of domestic and dating violence unprosecuted and 
unpunished’’). 
104 159 CONG. REC. S497–99 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2013) (statement of Sen. 
Cornyn). 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. This view of tribal criminal jurisdiction structure would have federalized 
SDVCJ, making convictions in tribal courts challengeable on direct appeal 
rather than through writ of habeas corpus.   
108 159 CONG. REC. S506 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2013) (statement of Sen. Cantwell). 
109 Id. 
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currently cannot be prosecuted by tribal governments,” the 
amendment allowed tribes to participate in the “locally based 
solutions to domestic violence that VAWA has so successfully 
promoted.”110 These protections would build on the TLOA, so that 
“no one [w]ould get away with domestic violence and rape” in 
Indian country.111  Proponents of VAWA 2013 “work[ed] with the 
Indian Affairs Committee … to fill a loophole in jurisdiction over 
perpetrators who have significant ties to the tribe in a very limited 
set of domestic violence cases involving an Indian victim on Indian 
land.” 112  Senator Leahy ensured VAWA 2013 “would … 
guarantee[] defendants comprehensive rights.”113 
Although agreeing with the majority that SDVCJ requires 
tribes prosecuting non-Indian defendants all the rights guaranteed 
by the United States Constitution, the minority questioned the 
“resources” and “expertise” of tribes to do so. 114  The minority 
senators asked, “on what basis does [the majority] think that the 
relatively small amount of money to provide grants to tribes will 
be sufficient to ensure that these defendants will be provided with 
all rights in all prosecutions authorized under [SDVCJ]?”115 The 
minority then also questioned “the estimate on caseload, cost, and 
other effects on the docket of federal district courts that would 
have to consider habeas corpus proceedings brought after tribal 
courts exercised their inherent powers under [VAWA 2013].”116 
The minority concluded that Senator Grassley’s substitute 
amendment would “best… improve the enforcement of laws 
against domestic violence in Indian territory” by providing 
appropriate resources for the federal government to fulfill those 
important responsibilities.117 The majority pointed out that tribal 
investigation and prosecution of crimes committed by non-Indians 
on reservation lands “will be more efficient and more effective 
than creating a massive new infrastructure, moving law 
                                                                                                             
110 159 CONG. REC. S480 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2013) (statement of Sen. Klobuchar). 
111 159 CONG. REC. S499 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2013) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
112 158 CONG. REC. S1991 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2012) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
113 Id. 
114 S. REP NO. 112-153, at 38 (2012) (minority views from Senators Grassley, 
Hatch, Kyl, and Cornyn). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
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enforcement and prosecutors often hours away from their current 
locations.”118 
C. Potential Future Expansion of Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction 
 
Within current Indian law jurisprudence, there is already a 
rationale for further expansion of tribal criminal jurisdiction. In 
Montana v. U.S., the Court extended its Oliphant rule to tribal civil 
jurisdiction by announcing that “the inherent sovereign powers of 
an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of non-members of 
the tribe.”119 The Court created two exceptions to the Montana rule 
because “Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise 
some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their 
reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands.”120 First, “a tribe may 
regulate …activities of non-members who enter consensual 
relationships with the tribe or its members.”121 Second, “a tribe 
may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the 
conduct of non-Indians on fee land within its reservation when that 
conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political 
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the 
tribe.” 122  The Montana exceptions preserve a tribe’s regulatory 
authority over non-members “connected to that ‘right of the 
Indians to make their own laws and be governed by them.’”123   
VAWA 2013 clearly, statutorily affirms inherent tribal 
jurisdiction under similar rationales to the two Montana 
exceptions. By limiting jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants to 
those with sufficient ties to the Indian tribe, Congress emulated the 
Montana “consensual relationship” exception. 124  A consensual 
relationship means SDVCJ defendants must “reside in the Indian 
country of the participating tribe,”125 be “employed in the Indian 
                                                                                                             
118 S. REP NO. 112-153, at 11, n.26 (2012). 
119 Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981). 
120 Id. at 565. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 566. 
123 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001) (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 
217 (1959)). 
124 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 
904(b)(4)(B), 127 Stat. 121 (2013) (codified at 25 U.S.C. 1304; § 904(b)(4)(B), 
127 Stat. at 122). 
125 Id. at § 904(b)(4)(B)(i), 127 Stat. at 122. 
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country of the participating tribe,” 126  or be a “spouse, intimate 
partner, or dating partner of a member of the participating tribe or 
an Indian who resides in the Indian country of the participating 
tribe.”127   
The concern for the safety of Native women outlined in the 
legislative history of VAWA 2013 128  falls within the second 
Montana exception providing that “tribe[s] may regulate 
nonmember conduct where that conduct ‘threatens or has some 
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the 
health or welfare of the tribe.’”129 Although the Supreme Court 
created an “elevated threshold … that tribal power must be 
necessary to avert catastrophic consequences” for meeting the 
second Montana exception, this rationale is especially pertinent to 
the rampant domestic violence that Native American women face 
in Indian country. 130  While the elevated “catastrophic 
consequences”131 has made the second Montana exception little 
more than a “dead letter” in the civil context,132 the passage of 
VAWA 2013 shows Congress may be willing to legislatively limit 
the restrictions of tribal jurisdiction under the second Montana 
exception rationale in the criminal context. 
Although federal courts have already developed tribal 
exhaustion jurisprudence, most of the federal courts’ forays into 
habeas review of tribal criminal prosecutions occurred before 
Congress established SDVCJ, and cases involving non-Indian 
defendants only reached the jurisdictional issues.133 Thus, current 
                                                                                                             
126 Id. at § 904(b)(4)(B)(ii), 127 Stat. at 122. 
127 Id. at § 904(b)(4)(B)(iii)(I, II), 127 Stat. at 122. 
128 See supra Section I.B, Legislative History of VAWA 2013. 
129 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 394 (2001) (citing Montana v. U.S. 450 U.S. 
544, 566 (1981). 
130 Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 
341 (2008). 
131 Id. 
132 Philip H. Tinker, In Search of a Civil Solution: Tribal Authority to Regulate 
NonMember Conduct in Indian Country, 50 TULSA L. REV. 193, 205 (2014) 
(Noting tribe met the high bar of jurisdiction in Water Wheel Camp Recreational 
Area, Inc. v. LaRance, where tribe has Montana II jurisdiction over a holdover 
tenant on tribal land, 642 F.3d 802, 819 (9th Cir. 2011), and Montana II 
jurisdiction established over non-Indian private security guards who conducted 
armed raid on the tribe’s government intending to take it over in Attorney’s 
Process and Investigation Servs., Inc., v. Sac and Fox Tribe of the Miss. in Iowa, 
609 F.3d 927, 939 (8th Cir. 2010)). 
133 See Garrow study, infra note 209. 
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law regarding tribal exhaustion for criminal convictions was 
created with the backdrop of Oliphant’s complete exemption of 
non-Indians from tribal criminal jurisdiction. Absent a judicial 
overruling of Oliphant, tribes should continue to look to Congress 
to reinforce tribal sovereignty by adopting Montana-style 
legislative exceptions for tribal criminal jurisdiction. Senator 
Tester already introduced such legislation to expand tribal 
jurisdiction over child violence and drug offenses in the Tribal 
Youth and Community Protection Act of 2016 and other criminal 
areas dealing with the “health or welfare of the tribe.”134 
 
II.FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 
 
Federal habeas corpus relief provides "the fundamental 
instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary 
and lawless state action" and “insure[s] that miscarriages of justice 
within its reach are surfaced and corrected."135  The doctrine of 
federal habeas corpus enables federal courts to “release or retry 
prisoners held in violation of the Federal Constitution.” 136 
Originally established in the Judiciary Act of 1789, the habeas 
corpus review of the federal courts only reached jurisdictional 
errors of federal convictions. However, in 1867, Congress 
expanded federal habeas corpus review to cover unconstitutional 
state convictions to protect civil rights after the Civil War.137 When 
federal courts decide habeas petitions from state prisoners, the  
state appellate courts are given deference to interpret state and 
federal law in the first instance and have the ability to avoid federal 
reversal of convictions through interpretation of state law.138 Only 
                                                                                                             
134 Tribal Youth and Community Protection Act of 2016, S. 2785, 114th Cong., § 
4. 
135 Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969). 
136 Timothy Finley, Habeas Corpus--Retroactivity of Post-Conviction Rulings: 
Finality at the Expense of Justice, 84 J. of Crim. L. and Criminology, 976 
(1994). 
137 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-
54 (2016)). 
138 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (a-c) (2000) (Congress establishes statutory exhaustion 
requirement); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886) (Supreme Court first adopts 
the Exhaustion Doctrine); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 434-35 (1963) (defining a 
test for the exhaustion requirement); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982) 
(all claims in a multipart habeas petition may be dismissed if the petitioner fails 
to exhaust any of the claims); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) 
(overruling Fay, in favor of upholding the finality of state court determinations). 
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after petitioners exhaust all of their state remedies are they able to 
petition the federal courts for habeas review. Overarching all of 
federal habeas corpus jurisprudence are the principles of comity, 
finality, fairness and judicial economy of the federal courts.139 
Supreme Court decisions and prior amendments of the Habeas 
Corpus Act of 1867 controlled federal habeas review.140 In passing 
AEDPA, Congress made it more difficult for state habeas 
petitioners to obtain federal review, much less receive relief in 
federal court.141 The expansions of civil rights and constitutional 
protections of the Bill of Rights against the states created minimum 
federal standards of due process throughout the country.142 
In recent years, both the Supreme Court and Congress have 
severely restricted the availability of habeas review for 
petitioners.143 In 1989, the Supreme Court limited application of 
the Retroactivity Doctrine, wherein a new criminal procedure rule 
cannot be applied to habeas petitioner’s whose conviction has 
already become final. 144  Congress limited habeas relief in the 
federal courts for state and federal petitioners by passing the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) in 1996.145 
                                                                                                             
139 Barry Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme Court’s Habeas Reform, 83 
CAL. L. REV. 485, 489 (1995); Karen M. Marshall, Finding Time for Federal 
Habeas Corpus: Carey v. Saffold, 33 AKRON L. REV. 549, 574 (2004). 
140 Pre-AEDPA habeas review included procedural defaults of claims by 
petitioners under Wainright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (no constitutional right 
to counsel for collateral attacks on state convictions under Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)), non-retroactive application of Supreme 
Court precedent on constitutional criminal procedure to finalized cases under 
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and harmless error review, which requires 
that trial errors have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in 
determining the jury’s verdict,” under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 
(1992). 
141 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (1996) (AEDPA added a one-year filing deadline for 
state habeas petitioners); U.S.C. § 2264(a) (limited cognizable substantive 
claims reviewable on habeas); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (mandated federal courts to 
generally defer to state court conclusions of federal law); 28 U.S.C. § 
2253(c)(1), (c)(3) (required circuit court judges to grant permission to appeal 
lower court denials of habeas petitions, limited to the issues specified); 28 
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1-2). 
142 Timothy Finley, Habeas Corpus--Retroactivity of Post-Conviction Rulings: 
Finality at the Expense of Justice, 84 J. of Crim. L. and Criminology, 977 
(1994). 
143 Joseph L. Hoffman & Nancy J. King, Rethinking The Federal Role In State 
Criminal Justice, 84. N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 792-94 (2009). 
144 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
145 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
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AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on individual 
habeas claims 146  and codified the Supreme Court’s state court 
remedy exhaustion rule.147 Most detrimental to habeas petitioners 
is AEDPA’s requirement that “any claim that was adjudicated on 
the merits” is barred from federal habeas review “unless the 
adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was 
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court; or 
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 
State court proceeding.”148  
In contrast, federal habeas review of tribal SDVCJ convictions 
is much more expansive. Unlike state court petitioners who wait 
years for federal habeas review, SDVCJ defendants have 
immediate federal habeas review, a right to petition for a stay of 
tribal detention, and the option to forego tribal appellate 
procedures and apply directly to the federal courts.149  In 1968, 
Congress provided by statute “the privilege of the writ of habeas 
corpus … to any person … to test the legality of his detention by 
order of an Indian tribe in a court of the United States.”150 ICRA 
provided individual rights, similar to the Bill of Rights, to Indians 
to protect them from their tribal governments.151 Although ICRA 
provided tribal citizens pseudo-constitutional individual rights, the 
Supreme Court held in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez that ICRA 
did not create a civil cause of action to sue tribes in federal court to 
enforce those rights.152 In holding that ICRA only provided habeas 
corpus relief to tribal convictions and not any form of federal civil 
action, the Court explained that:  
 
                                                                                                             
146 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (2012). 
147 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2010). 
148 Id. at § 2254(d). 
149 25 U.S.C. § 1304(e)(2) (2013). 
150 25 U.S.C. § 1303. 
151 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-02. 
152 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 70 (1978) (“ICRA was 
generally understood to authorize federal judicial review of tribal actions only 
through the habeas corpus provisions of § 1303. … Congress' rejection of 
proposals that clearly would have authorized causes of action other than habeas 
corpus, persuade us that Congress, aware of the intrusive effect of federal 
judicial review upon tribal self-government, [and] intended to create only a 
limited mechanism for such review, namely, that provided for expressly in § 
1303.”). 
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In settling on habeas corpus as the 
exclusive means for federal court 
review of tribal criminal 
proceedings, Congress opted for a 
less intrusive review mechanism than 
had been initially proposed. 
Originally, the legislation would 
have authorized de novo review in 
federal court of all convictions 
obtained in tribal courts. At hearings 
held on the proposed legislation in 
1965, however, it became clear that 
even those in agreement with the 
general thrust of the review 
provision–to provide some form of 
judicial review of criminal 
proceedings in tribal courts–believed 
that de novo review would impose 
unmanageable financial burdens on 
tribal governments and needlessly 
displace tribal courts. Moreover, 
tribal representatives argued that de 
novo review would "deprive the 
tribal court of all jurisdiction in the 
event of an appeal, thus having a 
harmful effect upon law enforcement 
within the reservation," and urged 
instead that "decisions of tribal 
courts . . . be reviewed in the U.S. 
district courts upon petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus.153   
 
Because Santa Clara prevents tribal civil litigants from seeking 
federal review, many Indian litigants have attempted to disguise 
their civil claims as habeas petitions to gain a federal forum for 
intra-tribal disputes. This has resulted in few ICRA habeas cases 
reaching the merits of the §1303 habeas petitions, and thus a dearth 
of substantive habeas jurisprudence that controls collateral attacks 
                                                                                                             
153 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 67 (1978) (“After considering 
numerous alternatives for review of tribal convictions, Congress apparently 
decided that review by way of habeas corpus would adequately protect the 
individual interests at stake while avoiding unnecessary intrusions on tribal 
governments”); see also id. at 70. 
2017] ICRA Habeas Corpus Relief 620 
 
 
of tribal convictions. 154  Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca 
Indians provides an extensive analysis of an ICRA habeas 
petition.155 In Poodry, the Seneca government banished a member 
after a contentious election. The Second Circuit held that, while 
banishment was not a criminal punishment, it was a sufficient 
restraint on liberty to qualify as “detention” under ICRA, thereby 
establishing federal court §1303 habeas jurisdiction.156 The Poodry 
court reasoned that banishment is essentially the same as being “in 
custody” in the rest of the world outside of the reservation. 157 
Neither federal common law nor 18 U.S.C. § 2254 federal habeas 
jurisprudence has interpreted the “in custody” requirement this 
broadly. 
This expansive reading of “detention” in ICRA Section 1303 
habeas has had limited effect. The federal courts have generally 
interpreted “detention” as similar to AEDPA’s “in custody” 
requirement and have prevented civil litigants from disguising civil 
issues as habeas corpus issues. 158  Some federal circuits have 
explicitly contradicted Poodry by holding that banishment from a 
reservation does not amount to detention under ICRA.159 
VAWA 2013 opponents harbored great concerns over the 
protection of defendants’ constitutional rights in SDVCJ 
prosecutions160 because tribal governments are not restrained by 
                                                                                                             
154 See generally, Garrow study infra note 203. 
155 85 F.3d 874 (2d Cir. 1996). 
156 Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 877 (2d Cir. 
1996). 
157 Id. at 895. (“We believe that Congress could not have intended to permit a 
tribe to circumvent the ICRA's habeas provision by permanently banishing, 
rather than imprisoning, [convicted] members [ ]. The severity of banishment as 
a restraint on liberty is well demonstrated by the Supreme Court's treatment of [ 
] “denaturalization” proceedings”). 
158 See Shenandoah v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 159 F.3d 708 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(Tribal member’s disenrollment, tribal employment termination, prohibition 
from tribal businesses and speaking to some tribal members did not constitute 
“detention.”); see also Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.Sup.2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(Tribal member and family excluded from tribal services did not amount to 
detention.); see also Shenandoah v. Halbritter, 275 F.Supp.2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 
2003)(Zealous tribal enforcement of tribal housing code did not constitute 
detention). 
159 Alire v. Jackson, 65 F.Supp.2d 1124, 1129 (D. Or. 1999) (despite exclusion, 
“Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a severe actual or potential restraint on her 
liberty sufficient to give rise to habeas relief”).  
160 See supra Section I.B, Legislative History of VAWA 2013 
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the United States Constitution. 161  However, habeas corpus 
challenges gain even more importance in the tribal (rather than 
state or federal) court context because the writ is the only vehicle 
for developing the law applicable to federal habeas challenges of 
tribal convictions. Additionally, there are no federal forums 
available for civil claims 162  against tribal officers that would 
otherwise be actionable against state and federal actors under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983163 or Bivens actions,164  respectively. Because the 
Court foreclosed tribal review of § 1983 claims in Nevada v. 
Hicks, complainants are limited to tribal laws enforced through 
tribal court decisions. 165  Although § 1983 claims are not 
enforceable against tribes in federal court, and tribal courts do not 
have subject matter jurisdiction for such claims, 166  tribes may 
develop their own equivalent laws or even waive immunity for 
these suits. 
Ultimately, ICRA § 1303 habeas review provides the only 
federal forum for tribal court defendants to challenge 
unconstitutional convictions. Although the United States 
Constitution does not directly apply to tribes, ICRA and TLOA 
provide constitutionally equivalent protections that ensure tribal 
court defendants receive similar individual rights as state court. If 
federal courts apply Indian law precedent, the ICRA statutory 
framework will still correspond with state habeas review standards 
in preventing the most egregious constitutional harms against 
defendants,167 while protecting tribal sovereignty and promoting 
tribal governance. 
                                                                                                             
161 Talton, 163 U.S. at 385 (conviction was “solely a matter within the 
jurisdiction of the courts of that Nation, and the decision of such a question, in 
itself, necessarily involves no infraction of the Constitution of the United 
States.”). 
162 Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 59-72. 
163 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a federal cause of action for a “person who, under 
the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, … subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within 
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution.”  Such person “shall be liable to the party injured in 
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 
164 Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
165 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 366 (2001) (holding that tribal courts are not 
courts of general jurisdiction and thus cannot adjudicate federal claims in the 
same manner as their state court counterparts). 
166 Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. 49 (upholding sovereign immunity). 
167 Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CAL. L. REV. 
1, 11 (2010). 
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A. ICRA § 1303 Habeas 
 
Indian tribes are “distinct, independent political communities, 
retaining their original natural rights.”168 “As separate sovereigns 
pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded 
as unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed 
specifically as limitations on federal or state authority.”169 Even 
after all Indians were granted American citizenship in 1924, and 
the Bill of Rights was applied to the states through selective 
incorporation, tribal courts remained unconstrained by the 
individual rights protections in the United States Constitution. This 
changed in 1968, when Senator Sam Ervin shepherded ICRA 
through Congress to expand civil rights to Native Americans.170 
Although framed as an expansion of civil rights to Native 
Americans, ICRA had a more nefarious purpose. Senator Ervin 
“tried to duplicate the North Carolina assimilation experience on a 
national level”171 by “subject[ing tribes] to the same limitations 
and restraints as those which are imposed on the [U.S.] 
Government.”172   
The ICRA established statutory protections of individual 
liberties for Native Americans in tribal courts. Concern in 
Congress over the lack of constitutional constraints on tribal 
governments led to its passage. However, it provided no federal 
cause of action for civil cases or criminal cases not resulting in 
detention for federal habeas corpus purposes.173 Because the ICRA 
habeas provision applies to “all persons” and not just tribal 
members or Indians,174 ICRA provides the only federal guarantees 
of due process and equal protection in tribal courts.175   
The VAWA 2013 amendments build on the Santa Clara rule 
precluding federal civil review while allowing habeas relief for 
criminal convictions regardless of Indian status.176 By restricting 
                                                                                                             
168 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832). 
169 Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 56. 
170 Robert Berry, Civil Liberties Constraints on Tribal Sovereignty after the 
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 1 J.L. & POL'Y 1 (1993). 
171 Donald Burnett, Jr., An Historical Analysis of the 1968 ‘Indian Civil Rights' 
Act, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 557, 575 (1972). 
172 111 CONG. REC. S1799 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1965) (statement of Sen. Ervin). 
173 Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 49. 
174 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2011). 
175 Id. 
176 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
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federal review under ICRA to the criminal context, the Santa 
Clara doctrine protects tribal sovereignty. Further expanding 
ICRA review would violate the “right of the reservation Indians to 
make their own laws and be ruled by them.”177 
ICRA’s § 1303 habeas corpus provision is subject to the same 
test for jurisdiction as “other statutory provisions governing habeas 
relief.”178 To “invoke jurisdiction of a federal court under § 1303 
[one] must demonstrate, under Jones v. Cunningham and its 
progeny, a severe actual or potential restraint on liberty.” 179  In 
Jones, the Court interpreted the “in custody” requirement of 28 
U.S.C. § 2241, which provided a federal forum for collateral 
appellate review of state convictions.180 The Jones court held that 
state parole entailed sufficient “restraints” on liberty to warrant 
habeas relief. 181  These restraints on liberty included directing 
petitioner to live with his aunt in Georgia, requiring permission to 
leave the community, change residence, or own or operate a car, 
reporting to his parole officer every month, and allowing home 
searches at will. 182  This federal habeas corpus jurisdiction was 
originally established in the aftermath of the Civil War when 
Congress passed the Habeas Act of 1867 to extend the writ to state 
custody for “cases where any person may be restrained of his or 
her liberty in violation of the Constitution, or of any treaty or law 
of the United States.”183   
Though many areas of Indian law are unique, by adopting § 
1303, “Congress did not…intend to create jurisdictional 
requirements different from those associated with traditional 
habeas remedies.” 184  This holding relates not only to § 1303 
language, but also to the treatment of petitioners. The fact that 
§1303 refers to “detention” by a tribe rather than being held “in 
                                                                                                             
177 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
178 Poodry, 85 F.3d at 880. 
179 Id. (citing Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963)) (holding that “besides 
physical imprisonment, there are other restraints on a man's liberty, restraints not 
shared by the public generally,” including parole). 
180 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (“The Writ of habeas shall not extend to a person unless 
he is in custody”).  
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1462 (14th ed. 2015) 
(citing Ex Parte McCardle, 73 U.S. 318, 318 (1867) (describing the Habeas Act 
of 1867)). 
184 Poodry, 85 F.3d at 893 n. 21. 
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custody” by a state for federal collateral review under § 2254185 is 
“unremarkable,” given that “Congress… use[s] the terms 
‘detention’ and ‘custody’ interchangeably in the habeas 
context.” 186  The Poodry court held that § 1303 federal habeas 
review is no “more expansive…than analogous statutes authorizing 
collateral review of state and federal action.”187 The Poodry Court 
explicitly reserved the question of “whether the substantive 
provisions of § 1302 must also be treated as coextensive with 
analogous constitutional provisions.”188   
Although the Poodry Court did not define the scope of § 1303 
habeas review, other federal circuits began a limited incorporation 
of a constitutional approach of rights through their ICRA 
counterparts. In U.S. v. Schmidt, the Eighth Circuit held that ICRA 
was not violated by the exigency doctrine to justify tribal police 
actions.189 In dictum, the Ninth Circuit has found that the ICRA 
and 4th Amendment standards are equivalent, in any event.190   
Although limited in number, these cases foreshadow a judicial 
process similar to the selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights 
through ICRA’s §1303 habeas review onto ICRA’s statutory 
procedural rights. This fragile statutory patchwork of ICRA’s 
pseudo-constitutional rights, and the court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence, will allow tribes to exercise their inherent 
sovereignty so long as they assert their jurisdiction in ways that 
coincide with United States constitutional standards. Otherwise, 
federal courts will overturn their convictions on habeas review.191 
This jerry-rigged statutory scheme protecting federal individual 
rights will constrain tribal courts through federal review, but 
preserve the core of tribal sovereignty as conceived under 
Worcester v. Georgia and Talton v. Mayes in the tribes’ internal 
affairs. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
185 Id. at 891. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 901. 
188 Id. at 893 n. 21. 
189 United States v. Schmidt, 403 F.3d 1009 (8th Cir. 2005). 
190 United States v. Becerra-Garcia, 397 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2005); see also 
United States v. Fuentes, 800 F.Supp.2d 1144 (D. Or. 2011). 
191 For example, intra-tribal criminal misdemeanors and civil issues will remain 
completely within tribal judicial control. 
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B. The Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine 
 
The doctrine of exhaustion is a fundamental aspect of habeas 
corpus across various legal contexts. The basis for the federal 
exhaustion requirement is to preserve the resources of the federal 
judiciary and to respect the sovereignty of the states and tribes in 
the federal system. Besides limiting federal jurisdictional reach 
over tribal proceedings, the doctrine of tribal exhaustion also limits 
federal review of tribal courts. The tribal exhaustion requirement is 
a judicial rule based in comity between the federal and tribal 
sovereigns where both sovereigns have concurrent jurisdiction 
over a claim.192 The doctrine is supported by the following three 
policy concerns: (1) “Congress[’s] commit[ment] to…supporting 
tribal self-government and self-determination”; (2) the “orderly 
administration of justice in the federal court[s]” through the 
development of a full record in tribal court; and (3) the provision 
of the tribal courts’ “expertise…in the precise basis for accepting 
jurisdiction” to federal courts in appellate review.193 Requiring a 
party to exhaust tribal remedies allows the tribal court a “full 
opportunity … to rectify any errors it may have made.”194 This 
means that, “at a minimum … tribal appellate courts must have the 
opportunity to review the determinations of the lower tribal courts” 
before parties can seek federal jurisdiction.195 
However, National Farmers created several exceptions to the 
requirement of tribal exhaustion. 196  First, exhaustion is not 
required if the tribal court intended to harass the party or claimed 
jurisdiction in bad faith.197 Second, if the tribal court’s assertion of 
jurisdiction violates an express jurisdictional prohibition, then the 
defendant is not subject to the exhaustion doctrine.198 Third, tribal 
exhaustion does not apply if a tribal appellate review would be 
                                                                                                             
192 Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Companies v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 
847 (1985); Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Construction and Application of 
Federal Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine, 186 A.L.R. FED. 71 (2003). 
193 Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856; Texaco, Inc. v. Zah, 5 F.3d 1374, 1375 (10th 
Cir. 1993).  
194 Valenzuela v. Silversmith, 699 F.3d 1199, 1206 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856). 
195 Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 17 (1987). 
196 Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856, n. 21. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
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futile because there is no tribal forum, there is no relief available, 
or tribal review is biased.199 The Court subsequently emphasized in 
Strate v. A-1 Contractors that National Farmers and Iowa Mutual, 
“enunciate only an exhaustion requirement, a ‘prudential rule,’ 
based on comity” and that regarding nonmembers, “a tribe's 
adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative 
jurisdiction.” 200  Strate also added one more exception to tribal 
exhaustion: “‘[w]hen...it is plain that no federal grant provides for 
tribal governance of nonmembers' conduct on land covered by 
Montana's main rule,’ the exhaustion requirement ‘would serve no 
purpose other than delay.’”201 
Although federal Indian law jurisprudence has created many 
exceptions to the tribal exhaustion rule, courts have generally 
enforced the rule. After the Supreme Court’s 1978 Oliphant 
decision to exempt non-Indians from tribal criminal jurisdiction, 
the only ICRA habeas questions to arise in federal court essentially 
have been jurisdictional challenges to tribal authority. Because of 
the Supreme Court’s Oliphant exemption for non-Indians, “the 
development of principles governing civil jurisdiction in Indian 
Country has been markedly different from the development of 
rules dealing with criminal jurisdiction.”202  Although few cases 
have reached federal review on the merits, the federal courts have 
developed a tribal exhaustion rule doctrine for habeas challenges to 
tribal convictions. 203  In the post-VAWA world, however, with 
explicit tribal jurisdiction for domestic violence crimes, these 
original principles of tribal exhaustion developed in the civil 
context have become applicable to Indian and non-Indian habeas 
challenges. Whereas some circuits have perceived an exception for 
non-Indian defendants, this was simply the application of the 
National Farmers’ lack of tribal jurisdiction exception and Strate’s 
delay exception in the criminal context.  
                                                                                                             
199 Id. 
200 Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997). 
201 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 369 (2001) (quoting Strate, 520 U.S. at 459, 
n.14). 
202 Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 854 (citing FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF 
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 253 (1982)). 
203 See generally Carrie E. Garrow, Habeas Corpus Petitions In Federal And 
Tribal Courts: A Search For Individualized Justice, 24 WM. & MARY BILL OF 
RTS. J. 137 (2015). 
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In reviewing ICRA § 1304(e)(2) challenges requesting 
immediate stays of detention, a federal court must base the 
“substantial likelihood” standard in existing Indian law 
jurisprudence. While habeas petitions have an underlying criminal 
conviction, these challenges are in fact civil in nature, and thus 
without more specific language in ICRA stating otherwise, 
National Farmers and its progeny provide existing precedent for 
federal courts to apply towards their analysis of immediate stays of 
detention. If petitioners do not meet these National Farmers’ 
exceptions, then a federal court may not grant relief under § 1303 
and § 1304. 
As different tribes exercise their inherent jurisdiction through 
prosecution of domestic and dating violence crimes involving both 
Indian and non-Indian defendants, the need for tribal appellate 
courts to review errors will necessarily grow. While TLOA and 
ICRA require public notice of tribal laws, judicial interpretation 
will still allow tribes to decide, in the first instance how to interpret 
their laws and whether certain ICRA rights are understood, similar 
to United States constitutional law. Until the tribal courts decide a 
SDVCJ appellate case, a federal court cannot interpret tribal laws 
in habeas review and thus usurp the jurisdiction granted to it under 
ICRA. Furthermore, the complexities of SDVCJ may raise 
jurisdictional and procedural errors that should be reviewed by the 
tribal appellate courts. Respecting tribal sovereignty with 
exhaustion requirements in these cases not only helps develop 
tribal law and keep tribal governments accountable but also 
promotes judicial economy and efficiency when considering § 
1303 petitions. 
Because of the barrier to federal court review established by 
Santa Clara, tribal petitioners have often attempted to expand the 
meaning of “detention” in the ICRA context 204  beyond the “in 
custody” requirement of AEDPA. 205  However, “the term 
‘detention’ in the [ICRA] statute must be interpreted similarly to 
the ‘in custody’ requirement in other habeas contexts.”206 Thus, “a 
                                                                                                             
204 See e.g., Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 880 (2d 
Cir. 1996). (arguing that banishment was detention); Lewis v. White Mountain 
Apache Tribe, No. CV-12-8073-PCT-SRB (DKD), 2013 WL 510111 (D. Ariz. 
Jan. 24, 2013) (petitioner’s liberty not restrained where tribe denied his bid to 
run for political office). 
205 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2011); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2011). 
206 Moore v. Nelson, 270 F.3d 789, 791 (9th Cir.2001). 
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federal court has no jurisdiction to hear a petitioner's claim for 
habeas corpus under § 1303 unless the petitioner is (1) in custody 
and (2) has exhausted all tribal remedies.”207 The federal courts 
explicitly defer to Congress’s exclusive authority over “any 
expansion[s] of [§ 1303 habeas] jurisdiction.” 208  In ICRA, 
Congress has given unprecedented relief to tribal court petitioners 
through immediate habeas review and interim relief through 
immediate stays of detention. In contrast, the federal habeas review 
to collaterally attack state convictions explicitly requires 
exhaustion of state remedies by statute. 209  Given the incredible 
difference in remedy a tribal court defendant has under § 1303 
versus the remedy a state court defendant has under § 2254, federal 
courts must interpret the “substantial likelihood” standard with 
great care and deference to Congress while maintaining current 
federal Indian law jurisprudence. 
Federal courts have followed the National Farmers tribal 
exhaustion rule in the habeas context, “recogniz[ing] that a 
petitioner must fully exhaust tribal-court remedies before a federal 
court can review challenges to his detention.” 210  The National 
Farmers’ exceptions allow petitioners to seek immediate federal 
review in the criminal habeas context.211 Thus, while tribal civil 
and criminal jurisdictions have developed in significantly different 
ways,212 several federal circuits require “that § 1303 petitioners 
must exhaust tribal court remedies … despite § 1303's lack of an 
express exhaustion requirement.” 213  Despite being “a prudential 
                                                                                                             
207 Lewis, 2013 WL 510111, at 12 (citing Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 
918 (2010)). 
208 Jeffredo, 599 F.3d at 918. 
209 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(1)(A) (2012). 
210 Acosta-Vigil v. Delorme-Gaines, 672 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1196 (2009) (citing 
Boozer v. Wilder, 381 F.3d 931, 935 (2004)); see also Azure–Lone Fight v. 
Cain, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1150 (2004); Quair v. Sisco, 359 F. Supp. 2d 948, 
971–72 (2004); Lyda v. Tah-Bone, 962 F.Supp. 1434, 1436 (1997). 
211 Garrow, supra note 203, at 149-50. 
212 FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (2009).  
213 Valenzuela v. Silversmith, 699 F.3d 1199, 1206 (2012); see also Jeffredo, 
590 F.3d at 756  (“[A] litigant must first exhaust tribal remedies before properly 
bringing a petition for writ of habeas corpus [pursuant to § 1303]”); Necklace v. 
Tribal Court of Three Affiliated Tribes, 554 F.2d 845, 846 (1977) (“[T]ribal 
remedies must ordinarily be exhausted before a claim is asserted in federal court 
under [§ 1303]”); see also FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 
§ 4.01 (Supp.2009) (“All federal courts addressing the issue mandate that two 
prerequisites be satisfied before they will hear a habeas petition filed under 
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rule based on comity,”214 federal courts have consistently upheld 
the exhaustion doctrine in § 1303 petitions. Under VAWA 2013, 
the federal courts must apply federal law to the § 1303 petitions, 
which directly incorporate the National Farmers’ exceptions into 
the “substantial likelihood” standard for reviewing requests for 
immediate stays under § 1304(e). Thus, if a petitioner does not 
meet one of these exceptions, then the petitioner has not shown “a 
substantial likelihood that the habeas corpus petition will be 
granted”215 under § 1303. 
A recent survey of the federal courts’ treatment of tribal court 
convictions during federal habeas review found only thirty cases of 
substantive federal habeas court decisions on ICRA habeas 
petitions.216  Out of the thirty cases, fifteen were “dismissed for 
failure to exhaust tribal court remedies,” five involved non-Indian 
defendants not subjected to the exhaustion rule,217 and ten received 
a federal review after exhaustion of tribal court remedies. Out of 
the ten ICRA habeas petitions achieving federal habeas review on 
the merits of the petitions, six were granted habeas relief and four 
were denied.218   
The survey concluded that the “federal courts’ deferral to tribal 
courts is citizenship based”219 because the “non-Indian status of the 
petitioner” is the “most common exception … to the exhaustion 
requirement.”220 She points to Oliphant and Duro, where the Court 
“proceed[ed] directly to the question of the tribal court’s 
jurisdiction.” 221  However, the Duro Court reviewed a tribal 
member’s § 1303 petition before the legislative Duro-fix, rather 
than a non-Indian’s habeas petition as in Oliphant.222  
Several cases weigh against this non-Indian exemption of the 
tribal exhaustion rule. In Greywater v. Joshua223 the Court held 
                                                                                                             
ICRA: The petitioner must be in custody, and the petitioner must first exhaust 
tribal remedies”). 
214 Valenzuela,699 F.3d at 1206-07. 
215 25 U.S.C. § 1304(e)(2)(A) (2013). 
216 Garrow, supra note 203, at 148. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 150. 
220 Id. at 148. 
221 Garrow, supra note 203, at 151. 
222 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 684-85 (1990); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian 
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195-96 (1978). 
223 Greywater v. Joshua, 846 F.2d 486, 493 (1988). 
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that a non-member Indian petitioner was not required to exhaust 
his tribal court remedies in a case that pre-dated the Duro-fix. In 
Connor v. Conklin, 224  the North Dakota District Court did not 
require a tribal member petitioner to exhaust tribal remedies; 
however, the tribe “did not raise the exhaustion requirement, and 
the court failed to address it.”225 Although this may demonstrate 
that § 1303 does not require express waiver of the exhaustion 
requirement as AEDPA does,226 Connor does not support a tribal 
exhaustion exception for non-Indian § .1303 petitioners. 
The Ninth Circuit has noted that despite “the federal district 
court entertain[ing Duro’s] habeas petition immediately after the 
tribal court had denied [his] motion to dismiss” the tribe made “no 
objection to the petition on the ground that the petitioner had not 
exhausted his tribal remedies.” 227  From this, the Wetsit court 
“infer[red] that when a tribal court attempts to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over a person not a member of a tribe, no requirement 
of exhaustion need be enforced.” 228  Although scholars have 
previously cited this non-Indian tribal appeals exemption rule as 
good law,229 no court has established such a rule. However, the 
Wetsit court mentioned this rule in dicta, comparing tribal 
exhaustion of “a person not a member of a tribe,” where “no 
requirement of exhaustion need be enforced” to “when the 
petitioner is a member of the tribe.”230 The fact that the Wetsit 
Court did not “note or observe that Congress had subsequently 
changed the Duro ruling by [] amendment,” nor did the Court’s 
“dicta statement [] refer to the amendment to 25 U.S.C. § 1301 
which confers criminal jurisdiction over ‘all Indians,’” nor “even 
mention 25 U.S.C. § 1301” shows “the dicta in Wetsit is without 
merit and incorrect.”231 Even if the Duro-fix had not taken effect 
already, the non-member remedy requirement was not properly 
before the Court, since both Wetsit and her victim were tribal 
members. 
                                                                                                             
224 Connor v. Conklin, No. A4-04-50, 2004 WL 1242513 (D.N.D. June 2, 2004). 
225 Garrow, supra note 203, at 152; Connor, No. A4-04-50, at *1-5. 
226 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3) (2011). 
227 Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, 826 (9th Cir. 1995). 
228 Id. 
229 Garrow, supra note 203, at 150-51. 
230 Westsit, 44 F.3d at 826. 
231 Lyda v. Tah-Bone, 962 F.Supp. 1434, 1435 (D. Utah, 1997). 
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In Wetsit, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
dismissal of an Indian’s § 1303 habeas petition, where Wetsit 
challenged her tribal detention for manslaughter charges after 
Wetsit stabbed her husband, also a Fort Peck tribal member, to 
death.232 The Fort Peck Tribal Court sentenced her to one year 
after a jury acquitted her in federal court under the Major Crimes 
Act.233 The district court dismissed her petition because she failed 
to exhaust her tribal remedies.234 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit ruled 
that a tribe has “jurisdiction over major crimes committed by a 
tribal member,” despite Wetsit’s “acquittal under the Major Crimes 
Act” by  federal court.235 Lastly, the Wetsit Court agreed that tribal 
members must exhaust all tribal remedies. 
Petitioner’s counsel did brief the court on tribal exhaustion, 
“respectfully submit[ting] that… the exhaustion requirement 
should not be imposed in criminal cases,”236 as petitioner had to, in 
order to argue the Major Crimes Act jurisdictional matter. 
Petitioner argued that had “Congress intended an exhaustion 
requirement for tribal prisoners, it would have expressly provided 
for one as it did in § 2254” since it was “codified long prior” to 
§1303 habeas in 1968.237   
The Ninth Circuit repeated its original misinterpretation of the 
Duro-fix in In re Garvais, holding that §1303 “does not require 
Garvais [a non-Indian BIA officer] to first exhaust his challenges 
in tribal court before seeking habeas relief in this court.”238 Much 
of the issue reviewed by the court was Garvais’s status as a non-
Indian because he “had been improperly granted [his Indian] 
preference” for his employment as a BIA officer.239  The Court 
incorrectly based this rule on Wetsit and on Means v. Northern 
Cheyenne Tribal Court,240 which the Ninth Circuit later clarified 
                                                                                                             
232 Wetsit, 44 F.3d at 824. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 826. 
236 Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 4, Westsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, (9th Cir. 
1995) 1994 WL 16048224, at *6-7. 
237 Id. at 8. 
238 In re Garvais, 402 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1220 (2004) (citing Wetsit, 44 F.3d at 
826); see also Means v. Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court, 154 F.3d 941, 942 
(9th Cir. 1998) (rev'd on other grounds, U.S. v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 
2001)).     
239 In re Garvais, 402 F.Supp.2d at 1222. 
240 Means, 154 F.3d at 942. 
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held that the “1990 ICRA amendments do not apply retroactively 
and that, under Duro, Means was not subject to the criminal 
jurisdiction of another tribe.”241 The In re Garvais Court claimed 
that Means was reversed on other grounds in U.S. v. Enas, where 
the court attempted to reconcile its previous decisions’ improper 
readings of the Duro-fix.242 However, while Enas did not rule on § 
1303 exhaustion requirements directly, it clearly contradicted the 
foundational Duro-related principles that Wetsit and its misguided 
progeny were based upon. 
Even including the Oliphant decision, no federal court has held 
the non-Indian status of a § 1303 habeas petitioner to be an 
exception to the National Farmers tribal exhaustion requirement. 
Nor should the courts create one based on the same policy issues of 
comity and federal court administrative concerns. Doing so goes 
against Congress’s policy of “tribal support”243 and would open up 
further litigation stagnating federal dockets with further ICRA-
specific habeas jurisprudence. Because the § 1303 habeas 
jurisprudence is so undeveloped, many issues that have been 
resolved in the § 2254 context must be extended by analogy or 
fully litigated through collateral attacks on tribal convictions. 
 
III.A NEW HABEAS CORPUS JURISPRUDENCE? 
 
Although seemingly innocuous, the immediate stay of 
detention petition provision raises several potential problems to the 
federal courts’ judicial jurisprudence of § 1303 habeas relief. If 
federal courts treat § 1303 habeas petitions differently from § 2254 
relief, then a new § 1303-specific habeas corpus jurisprudence 
must be developed. Developing a new § 1303 habeas jurisprudence 
will come at great cost to tribal governments that must defend 
convictions in federal court. Both tribal court defendants, who 
essentially must re-litigate habeas issues already settled in the state 
                                                                                                             
241 U.S. v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662, 664 (9th Cir. 2001).  
242 Enas, 255 F.3d at 675 (“We conclude that Congress had the power to 
determine that tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians was inherent. 
Therefore, acting under the 1990 amendments to the ICRA, the White Mountain 
Apache Tribe prosecuted Enas pursuant to its own inherent power, and a federal 
prosecution would proceed pursuant to a separate source of power.”). See also, 
U.S. v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (affirming this same principle three years 
after Enas). 
243 Nat'l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 845.  
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habeas review context, and Indian victims will relive the traumatic 
experiences simply because the jurisprudence is unclear. 
The legislative history of VAWA 2013 does focus on habeas 
corpus under section 1303 of ICRA. The SCIA acknowledged that 
“defendants typically would have a direct right to appeal to a tribal 
appellate court,” and could file the writ of habeas in federal court 
under ICRA, but “there would [] be no direct right of appeal to a 
Federal court.”244 Despite this claim, the report then discusses that 
the “purpose of the subsection on ‘Petitions to Stay Detention’ … 
would clarify the current legal standards for determining whether a 
person can be released from tribal detention prior to final 
resolution of his habeas petition.”245 The ability of a federal court 
to grant habeas relief to a petitioner without resolving their habeas 
petition is essentially a direct appeal right, since it provides a 
collateral attack on the tribal conviction without exhaustion of 
tribal remedies. Congress explicitly debated the consequences of 
creating a delegated authority with a direct appeal, or loosening 
restrictions on inherent tribal authority and providing federal 
habeas corpus review to tribal convictions. This clear legislative 
history must be kept in mind when federal courts adjudicate ICRA 
habeas petitions. 
Alternatively, federal courts may apply already existing habeas 
corpus jurisprudence to the §1303 habeas petitions, considering 
National Farmers and its progeny. However, the legal mechanics 
of applying existing federal habeas law to ICRA habeas review is 
unclear. Federal courts could translate the constitutional rights-
based habeas corpus precedents to ICRA statutory habeas claims, 
analogize any § 1303 habeas issues to relevant § 2254 sections, or 
create an entirely new §1303 habeas jurisprudence that respects the 
unique aspects of “domestic dependent nations.”246 
Regardless of the approach the federal courts take, VAWA’s 
stay of detention relief raises several important issues for the 
collateral attack of tribal convictions. Judicially-created exceptions 
to the tribal exhaustion rule in federal habeas relief offend tribal 
                                                                                                             
244 SCIA, Stand Against Violence and Empower (SAVE) Native Women Act, 
Senate Report 112-265 (December 27, 2012). The SAVE Act was the 
predecessor legislative effort, eventually passing as part of the VAWA 
amendments. 
245 Id. 
246 Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 15 (1831).  
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sovereignty and weaken tribal judicial institutions by eliminating 
their appellate jurisdiction. Ultimately, this will deter tribal efforts 
to implement VAWA, thereby to protect Native American women 
and ultimately tribal communities.   
 
A. Tribal Exhaustion Under VAWA 2013 
 
Because petitions must demonstrate a “substantial likelihood” 
that they would be granted in order to receive immediate remedies, 
to be excepted from the tribal exhaustion requirements a petitioner 
must meet that standard. Under current Indian case law, a 
petitioner would meet that standard by proving that any of the 
National Farmers’ exceptions apply to his or her case. In defining 
the “substantial likelihood” standard, the habeas court may apply 
federal habeas corpus based on constitutional rights by analogy to 
federal court decisions interpreting statutory §1303 habeas relief. 
Alternatively, courts find that the quasi-constitutional rules 
established by TLOA and VAWA require an entirely new federal 
§1303 habeas jurisprudence. Either way, the federal courts must 
establish guidelines for tribes in the federal habeas context. Absent 
clear direction from the Supreme Court on applicable habeas 
jurisprudence, tribal habeas relief will become an even more 
confused morass of constitutional law, federal Indian law, and 
federal court processes. 
Left unresolved, §1303 relief will cause three main problems 
for tribal courts. First, without specific guidance on ICRA habeas 
jurisprudence, federal courts may offend and diminish tribal 
sovereignty through misapplication of §1303 habeas jurisprudence. 
Second, federal courts will create further confusion over the tribal 
exhaustion requirement for all §1303 habeas petitioners—whether 
Indian or non-Indian—regardless of the length of sentencing. 
Third, absent guidance on the “substantial likelihood” standard for 
immediate release, VAWA will have a chilling effect on the tribal 
exercise of SDVCJ.  
Without clear guidance from Congress and the federal courts, 
the SDVCJ may create another layer of confusion in Indian law 
jurisprudence, negating the real impact VAWA could have in 
Indian country. First, disregard of the tribal exhaustion rule on 
habeas review would create a lesser standard for collateral attacks 
on tribal convictions than state court convictions. Although the 
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Oliphant Court noted that state sovereigns are not equivalent to 
tribes, which it called "quasi-sovereign entities,"247 this principle 
has limited inherent tribal jurisdiction, not federal court 
jurisdiction of review where tribes have personal and subject 
matter jurisdiction. By providing a cause of action to stay tribal 
detention even before the federal court has reached a final decision 
on the habeas case, Congress gives much more deference to state 
courts than tribal courts. By giving immediate habeas corpus 
review to tribal petitioners and not state petitioners, Congress has 
significantly weakened tribal courts. Congress is demanding that 
tribes raise the level of legal practice in tribal courts through the 
requirements of TLOA and VAWA, yet through §1303(e) it 
simultaneously weakens the purview of tribal courts. 
Second, §1303(e) contradicts the well-established National 
Farmers doctrine of tribal exhaustion, which applies even in the 
criminal conviction context.248 By providing an immediate stay of 
detention provision, SDVCJ defendants may gain immediate 
access to federal habeas review. This distinction between §1303 
and §2254 habeas relief throws into doubt federal court §1303 
habeas jurisprudence. The Second Circuit previously held §1303 
habeas review to be equivalent in scope to its analogous state court 
habeas corpus review statutes. 249  This framework would make 
federal habeas jurisprudence applicable to §1303 petitions.   
By explicitly including some constitutional protections into the 
VAWA and TLOA statutes but not others, Congress has created 
ambiguity in the applicable habeas corpus jurisprudence that 
federal courts should use to review §1303 petitions. The rule 
against surplusage 250  could make the inclusion of the Sixth 
Amendment fair cross-section jury requirement and indigent 
defense counsel in Section 1304(d) redundant. Alternatively, the 
ICRA can be read as highlighting these specific rights without 
excluding “all other rights…necessary…for Congress to recognize 
                                                                                                             
247 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 196 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 
(1974)).  
248 See infra, Section II.  
249 Poodry, 85 F.3d at 880. 
250 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (West Group, 
3d. ed. 2001). 
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and affirm”251 the tribe’s SDVCJ. Section 1303(e)’s exception to 
the National Farmers, and habeas corpus exhaustion rule for 
SDVCJ defendants, creates different avenues for collateral attacks 
on tribal convictions depending on the subject matter of the 
underlying charges involved. This is a fundamental difference 
from §2254 collateral review, which requires exhaustion of state 
appellate remedies and treats all petitions equally, regardless of the 
underlying offense. The more differences between §1303 and other 
statutory habeas review procedures there are, the more need for 
federal courts to create new habeas jurisprudence and the less 
certainty there is for participating tribes, as well as federal courts. 
Rather than implementing a non-Indian exception similar to the 
Ninth Circuit’s misguided Westsit progeny, the federal courts 
should only create exceptions based upon similar principles found 
in constitutional habeas corpus jurisprudence or analogous §2254 
habeas decisions. For example, federal courts have permitted 
habeas review where the tribe lacked explicit habeas corpus 
provisions and only had informal procedures for seeking relief 
through the tribal court. 252  For obvious violations of the 
defendants’ rights such as this, the National Farmers exceptions 
allow federal courts to provide a remedy without a harsh rule 
exempting non-Indians from tribal appellate jurisdiction. 
In Necklace v. Three Affiliated of Fort Berthold Reservation, 
the Eighth Circuit reviewed an Indian petitioner’s writ of habeas 
corpus, which challenged a tribal involuntary commitment order to 
a state hospital where she had been committed five years earlier. 
The Eighth Circuit found that “because [tribal laws] contain no 
formal habeas corpus procedure,” petitioner was not “required to 
exhaust her tribal remedies.” Therefore, the court reversed the 
lower court’s requirement for trial exhaustion.253 Given the lack of 
any formal habeas corpus review process by the tribal court, this 
decision both respects the National Farmers exhaustion rule and 
conforms to similar treatment of state proceedings under §2254.254   
                                                                                                             
251 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 
904, 127 Stat. 121 (2013); Stand Against Violence and Empower Native 
Women Act, S. 1763, 112th Cong. § 201 (2012). 
252 Necklace v. Tribal Court of Three Affiliated Tribes, 554 F.2d 845, 846 (8th 
Cir. 1977). 
253 Id. 
254 25 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2011). 
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Until Congress further develops ICRA habeas corpus 
procedures, federal courts “should not address a petitioner's 
unexhausted claims, unless the petitioner shows that one of the 
doctrine's narrow exceptions applies.”255 Federal courts must look 
to National Farmers and its progeny to permit §1303 petitioners 
avoiding the tribal exhaustion requirements. While criminal 
jurisdiction may be based on the Indian or non-Indian political 
status of a defendant under Oliphant, federal courts should not 
draw similar distinctions for habeas review.   
Although federal courts may view Oliphant as establishing a 
tribal exhaustion exception,256 the Court decided Oliphant before 
announcing the National Farmers tribal exhaustion requirement in 
1985. 257  Furthermore, the court strengthened the exhaustion 
requirement in Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante in 1987, holding 
that “issue[s] of jurisdiction be resolved by the Tribal Courts in the 
first instance” and that “local bias and incompetence” in tribal 
courts don’t merit exceptions.”258  
To fulfill Congress’s own policy of supporting tribal 
sovereignty, courts should “preserve the ‘authority of the tribal 
courts.’” 259  As Congress, guided by the Montana exceptions, 
continues to dismantle further restraints on inherent tribal criminal 
jurisdiction,260 federal courts must exercise restraint and deference 
similar to that required under §2254 review. Until §1303 is further 
developed by explicit legislation, federal courts should base §1303 
decisions on the Indian canons of construction and habeas corpus 
jurisprudence that is still applicable after the passage of the 
AEDPA in 1996.   
                                                                                                             
255 Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Selam v. 
Warm Springs Tribal Corr. Facility, 134 F.3d 948, 954 (9th Cir. 1988). 
256 At most, Oliphant could be read to establish an immediate jurisdictional 
challenge in federal court, rather than a distinct federal habeas corpus right 
based upon Indian or non-Indian status.   
257 Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 845.  
258 Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Laplante, 480 U.S. 9, 18-19 (1987). 
259 O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140, 1146 (1973) (quoting 
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959). 
260 Tribal Youth and Protection Act of 2016, S. 2785, 114th Cong. (2016) (On 
April 12, 2016, Sen. Tester introduced S.2785 “Tribal Youth and Community 
Protection Act of 2016,” which will expand tribal criminal subject matter 
jurisdiction over child and drug violence crimes. This bill functions by 
amending Section 204 of Public Law 90–284 (25 U.S.C. 1304), thus tribes 
would be able to prosecute Indian non-Indian defendants alike for these 
categories of crimes). 
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Before judicially creating any further exceptions to National 
Farmers exhaustive list, federal courts must “weigh[] the need to 
preserve the cultural identity of the tribe by strengthening the 
authority of the tribal courts, against the need to immediately 
adjudicate alleged deprivations of individual rights.” 261  In 
particular, federal habeas courts adopting the O’Neal balancing test 
should update the factors in light of the purposes of VAWA’s Title 
IX amendment. In addition to cultural needs, federal courts should 
weigh the safety of the tribal community, federal inaction to 
maintain a safe environment and the efforts of the tribe to ensure 
the public safety of Indian country.  
Third, the ICRA’s §1304(e) “substantial likelihood” standard 
for §1303 SDVCJ habeas petitions is undefined in the 
statute.262Because the stay of detention upon petition is a unique 
remedy in federal habeas corpus law, a reviewing court will have 
to interpret the standard based on other federal law. In state 
collateral proceedings, §2254 requires “the applicant [to] exhaust[] 
the remedies available in the courts of the State,” 263  unless no 
“state corrective process is … available” or such process is 
ineffective to protect the applicant.264  Although §1303 does not 
provide the same explicit comprehensive statutory framework for 
collateral attacks on tribal convictions as §2254, the legislative 
history of both statutes, congressional policy considerations in 
Indian affairs and the Indian canons of construction265 result in at 
least equivalent protections of sovereignty afforded to tribes as 
states during federal habeas review. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
261 O'Neal, 482 F.2d at 1146. 
262 25 U.S.C. § 1303(e) (2013). 
263 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2011). 
264 Id. at § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i-ii). 
265 Conference of Western Attorneys General, American Indian Law Deskbook 
§ 1:6. Federal common law application of Marshall trilogy principles—Indian 
canons of construction (May 2016 update), (“The practical effect of the canons 
is to resolve ambiguities or “doubtful expressions” in the affected Indians' 
favor.”); see also Phillip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present Colonialism, 
Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 381 (1993) (Justice Marshall’s creation of the Indian canons protected 
tribal sovereignty). 
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B. The Substantial Likelihood Standard 
 
To define the “substantial likelihood” standard, a federal court 
could look to several areas of law. Similar language is found in the 
civil context of preliminary injunctions, which require “substantial 
likelihood of success on the merits.”266 This gives no guidance or 
controlling language to the ICRA habeas proceedings. A plain 
language reading of §1304(e) may also lead the courts to the 
United States Code Title 18’s release pending sentencing 
provision. Although not mentioned in the legislative history, the 
language and structure of Section 1304(e)(2)(A-B) tracks closely 
the language of 18 U.S.C. §3143 “[r]elease or detention of a 
defendant pending sentence or appeal.” That provision requires 
that “a person who has been found guilty of an offense” be 
detained prior to sentencing or upon appeal unless “there is a 
substantial likelihood that a motion for acquittal or new trial will 
be granted.”267 In addition, the “judicial officer [must] find[] by 
clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee 
or pose a danger to any other person or the community.”268   
Congress’s conception of ICRA habeas relief in terms of a pre-
sentencing or post-conviction release of federal defendants is both 
problematic and emblematic of the long history of efforts to 
federalize tribal laws. 269  However, by using language from 
statutory provisions controlling post-conviction release for federal 
defendants at the trial and direct appeal levels, Congress gives no 
guidance to tribes and SDVCJ defendants seeking habeas review. 
Because SDVCJ is inherent in tribal nations, judicial analysis of 
the 18 U.S.C. §3143 post-conviction release language is only 
relevant by analogy to ICRA habeas relief where the federal 
government does not have jurisdiction over the defendant.   
                                                                                                             
266 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. 
267 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2)(A)(i) (2011). 
268 Id. at § 3143(a)(2)(B). 
269 See SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG’S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN 
SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY (1994) (The BIA originally pushed for the Major Crimes Act in the 
wake of Ex part Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883) (commanding the release of 
Crow Dog – who was found guilty of murdering Spotted Tail in federal court – 
because the federal courts had no jurisdiction over Indian crimes in Indian 
country, to gain more authority to carry out its goal of forcibly assimilating 
Indian tribes).   
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Courts could also resolve the “substantial likelihood” standard 
by looking empirically at the circumstances where federal courts 
granted federal habeas corpus relief previously to §1303 
petitioners. As the Garrow survey found, only four out of thirty 
§1303 petitions resulted in habeas relief after exhaustion of tribal 
remedies.270  However, as the survey notes, Spears v. Red Lake 
Band of Chippewa Indians 271  has since been discredited. 272 
Moreover, new case law has affirmed that tribal courts have 
jurisdiction over an elected official who sexually assaults a tribal 
employee at the off-reservation tribal headquarters.273 Thus, basing 
the likelihood on past ICRA habeas cases does not necessarily 
incorporate the new expanses of tribal court jurisdiction. 
In only one of the cases Professor Garrow surveyed was there a 
true due process violation. In Wounded Knee v. Andera, the federal 
habeas court granted relief for a defendant convicted at a 
“considerably less than desirable” trial where the tribal judge’s 
“dual role” as judge and prosecutor “necessarily violate[d] due 
process.” 274  Though the tribe was “financially unable to hire a 
prosecutor…financial obstacles” do not permit the tribe “to deny 
persons liberties and rights secured by…ICRA.” 275  Despite this 
basic violation of the fundamental impartiality of the judge, the 
federal court still required exhaustion of tribal process. 
In two of the cases, the tribal court misapplied fundamental 
criminal procedure concepts. Johnson v. Tracy concerned a basic 
misapplication of federal statutory law to a post-TLOA prosecution 
of a crime occurring before TLOA’s passage. 276  The Arizona 
District Court found that TLOA’s passage did not create 
                                                                                                             
270 Garrow, supra note 203, at 153-55; Additionally, both Oliphant, Duro and 
the Duro-related cases should be discounted as they were based on jurisdictional 
issues. 
271 Spears v. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 363 F.Supp.2d 1176, 1176 
(D. Minn., 2005).  
272 Miranda v. Anchondo, 684 F.3d 844, 848 (9th Cir., 2011) (“The statutory 
language ‘any one offense’ [in § 1302(7)] has a plain meaning, and that the 
district court erred in relying on the statute's legislative history to manufacture 
ambiguity in this otherwise clear language.  As it is undisputed that Petitioner 
committed multiple criminal violations, the district court erred in concluding 
that her 910–day sentence violated § 1302(7)”). 
273 Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 849 (6th Cir. 2016). 
274 Wounded Knee v. Andera 416 F. Supp. 1236, 1236 (D.S.D. 1976). 
275 Id. at 1240-41. 
276 Johnson v. Tracy, No. CV-11-01979-PHX-DGC, 2012 WL 4478801 (D. 
Ariz. Sept. 28, 2012). 
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retroactivity or ex post facto concerns because “as a general matter, 
‘a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its 
decision.’” 277  Because the tribe convicted petitioner after the 
passage of the TLOA on July 29, 2010, he “should have been 
accorded the procedural protections of 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c) that 
were then in effect as a result of the TLOA amendments.” 278 
However, while the court vacated the verdict and unlawful 
sentence, it emphasized that petitioner’s “new trial may again 
result in petitioner's sentence for consecutive one-year sentences as 
was permitted before the TLOA.”279   
Although the Constitution does not apply to tribal 
governments, the Garrow survey shows that only Wounded Knee 
involved a true civil rights violation warranting the grant of a writ 
of habeas corpus. In six other instances “petitioners raised various 
challenges: equal protection and due process, that the trial judge 
was improperly in office, the failure to prove Indian status, right to 
counsel, the right to confrontation, right to compulsory process, 
and right to a jury trial,” and all were denied habeas relief in 
federal court.280 The Garrow survey shows that when correcting for 
changes in the law and jurisdictional issues, the federal courts 
rarely overturn tribal criminal convictions. 
 
IV.CONCLUSION 
 
Tribes are just beginning to convict defendants under VAWA 
and TLOA in Indian country. The VAWA pilot program has been 
very successful, with tribal SDVCJ charges resulting in eleven 
being dismissed for jurisdictional or investigative reasons, ten 
guilty pleas, five referrals for federal prosecution, and one acquittal 
by a jury.281 The participating tribes exercising SDVCJ after the 
pilot program have had similar results. 282  So far, no ICRA 
                                                                                                             
277 Id. at *7 (citing Bradley v. School Bd. of City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 
711 (1974)). 
278 Id. at *5. 
279 Id. 
280 Garrow, supra note 203, at 157. 
281 Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction Pilot Project Report, 
NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS (NCAI), (Oct. 29, 2015), 
http://www.ncai.org/attachments/NewsArticle_VutTUSYSfGPRpZQRYzWcuL
ekuVNeeTAOBBwGyvkWYwPRUJOioqI_SDVCJ%20Pilot%20Project%20Re
port_6-7-16_Final.pdf. 
282 Id. 
2017] ICRA Habeas Corpus Relief 642 
 
 
defendants have sought collateral review of SDVCJ convictions in 
federal court.283 However, as tribal participation grows and more 
charges are brought against non-Indians, and tribal courts 
implement enhanced TLOA sentencing, more habeas challenges 
will be brought before the federal courts.  
The discussion for tribes is already shifting to concerns over 
§1303 habeas relief,284 which will affect not only SDVCJ but any 
further sentencing or legislative Oliphant exceptions in the future. 
Congress and individual tribes have invested great amounts of 
resources into these Indian country safety efforts. Federal courts 
should weigh §1303 petitions with that consideration in mind as 
they resolve the many issues left unresolved by the court’s habeas 
jurisprudence. 
Congress has breathed new life into tribal sovereignty and self-
determination in the criminal context through its first partial 
Oliphant-fix. However, tribes must bear in mind that ICRA’s 
habeas relief gives federal courts access to their legislative and 
cultural purview in ways they have not experienced since Santa 
Clara. Tribes must be ready and able to defend their convictions 
on federal collateral review, while also maintaining the cultural 
integrity of their tribal courts. Otherwise, VAWA’s SDVCJ will 
eventually create the system that Senator Sam Ervin originally 
conceived of, where ICRA would provide a vehicle for further 
assimilation of tribes.285 
 
                                                                                                             
283 Donald Trump's Justice choice leaves door open to fight tribal jurisdiction, 
INDIANZ.COM (January 11, 2017), 
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284 Legislative Hearing on S. 2785, A Bill to Protect Native Children and 
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